Pay Attention to Beijing's Interpretation of the Tsai-Lai Team

 Pay Attention to Beijing's Interpretation of the Tsai-Lai Team

China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan)

September 6, 2017

 Translation of an Excerpt

Cross-Strait relations are the crux of security and development on Taiwan. The Tsai government has not shown any willingness to accept the "1992 Consensus," plummeting cross-Strait relations into the doldrums; however, it can still strictly observe the commitment to “maintaining the status quo,” causiously handling cross-Strait issues. On the eve of the CCP’s 19th National Party Congress, both sides had, wittingly or unwittingly, exhibited certain signals of goodwill, showing cues of turning around for the better in cross-Strait political atmospherics. However, at this time, all of a sudden, Lai Ching-te’s appointment as the second premier under the Tsai Ing-wen government was reported, perplexing Beijing. Just what is the signal? Is the Tsai government prepared to use “highhandedness for highhandedness”?

The Mainland’s perplexity was not unfounded; the Tsai government’s foreign affairs and cross-Strait departments had indeed strictly observed the proclamation of "maintaining the status quo," but the departments of culture and education proactively pushed for policies of "de-Sinicization," accelerating the delinking of cross-Strait cultural, historical and social ties. This had already caused the Mainland to doubt the Tsai government’s good faith in "maintaining the status quo." Now again, by appointing Lai Ching-te, who dislikes China and likes Japan, to form a Cabinet, is it preparing to accelerate its stance of pro-Japan and distancing from China?

Observing reports of Lai Ching-te’s forming a Cabinet by media outlets with official Mainland backgrounds, Beijing has apparently adopted a negative interpretation. On the eve of the CCP’s 19^th National Party Congress, currently it is very difficult to predict how strong Beijing's backlash will be. However, in accordance with the practices of the CCP's policy-making and politico-cultural judgments of the bureaucracy, the recoil would very likely be strong.

The Tsai government must first recognize the risks involved in this matter; the national security apparatus must cope with it with a serious attitude, on the one hand strengthening the gathering and analysis of information, preparing all possible back-up plans, getting ready for crisis management. On the other hand, it should exhibit strong and correct signals with the Mainland so as to avoid a situation where Beijing makes erroneous judgments and policies, creating unnecessary cross-Strait risks.

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