Tsai Gov’t’s Blind Spots in Cross-Strait Relations Viewed from Four Scenarios

 Tsai Gov’t’s Blind Spots in Cross-Strait Relations Viewed from Four Scenarios

United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan)

April 17, 2018

 Translation of an Excerpt

Recently, the US and China have endlessly crossed swords in their trade war and frequently wrestled with each other geopolitically and militarily. Mainland China’s rise has apparently changed the impact on the international politico-economic map of forces. While Taiwan is worried about whether our relevant industries will be hurt, we should even more prudently cope with about the changes in the trilateral relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, seeking our point of leverage.

In recent years, Mainland China’s economic scale has been continuously expanding; lately it has been pushing for the strategy of "Made in China 2025," which all the more has the tendency to threaten key US industries. According to a survey by an international institution, between 2007 and 2016, the Mainland’s accumulated military expenditures grew by 118%, becoming the second largest in the world; the comprehensive politico-economic strength and voice on the international stage have greatly expanded. The US of course wants to construct a strategy toward China anew.

If we conduct a scenario analysis on the facets related to the degree of the seriousness and urgency of cross-Strait economic/trade relations (often decided by China), the breadth of scope and tempo of our counter strategy (Taiwan has a leverage point), generally speaking, the scenarios may be classified into four: when seriousness and urgency are relatively low, if Taiwan’s response is big in scope, quick in speed, we will have an advantage. Conversely, it will be advantageous to the Mainland. Undeniably our advantage is in the process of eroding.

Summing up, the changes in cross-Strait economic/trade relations for the last twenty years, the advantages originally enjoyed by Taiwan have been rapidly diminishing, and the earlier room for response has also become narrower. The Tsai government should perceive clearly the current status of a weakening trilateral strategic relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan; it must also understand the reality that Mainland China has the advantage of time. Based on this, it should pragmatically review the priorities and wins/losses in cross-Strait policies so as to avoid the loss of good opportunities repeatedly by Taiwan.

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