Appointments of Tien and Huang Reflect Tsai 's Strategic Predicament

Appointments of Tien and Huang Reflect Tsai 's Strategic Predicament

United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)

A Translation

September 6, 2016

Executive Summary:

Tsai Ing-wen has finally decided whom to appoint to two positions charged with regional development and cross-Strait relations. The SEF Chairman appointment has been hastily finalized. Former Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao will assume the post. The post of Representative to Singapore left vacant by Chiang Shun-nan, who resigned after his arrest for drunk driving, will be filled by James Huang, New Southward Policy Office Chief. Both individuals’ C.V.s are ok, but not necessarily the right man for the job. These appointments reflect President Tsai's desperation and strategic confusion. The results have been penny wise and pound foolish. Gains in one area have been at the expense of losses in another.

Full Text Below:

The Tsai government has been in office over 100 days. Tsai Ing-wen has finally decided whom to appoint to two positions charged with regional development and cross-Strait relations. The SEF Chairman appointment has been hastily finalized. Former Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao will assume the post. The post of Representative to Singapore left vacant by Chiang Shun-nan, who resigned after his arrest for drunk driving, will be filled by James Huang, New Southward Policy Office Chief. Both individuals’ C.V.s are ok, but not necessarily the right man for the job. These appointments reflect President Tsai's desperation and strategic confusion. The results have been penny wise and pound foolish. Gains in one area have been at the expense of losses in another.

Personnel appointments must be guided by strategic vision. They are the opening gambits by which strategic visions are realized. These appointments reflect Tsai Ing-wen's shortcomings in global strategic planning.

First take cross-Strait relations. President Tsai refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, yet insists in stating that the two sides must maintain the status quo. Thus, in the matters of appointees to the MAC and SEF, even if they may not be able to break the cross-Strait deadlock, they must at least avoid worsening cross-Strait relations. The appointment of Katharine Chang as MAC Chairwoman was announced before May 20. This move was precisely based on the assumption that the appointment would not provoke the Mainland, and she was a relatively safe choice domestically. For the same reason, James Soong or Wang Jin-pyng was slated to head SEF. But Tsai Ing-wen dragged her feet and refused to give the Mainland a straight answer about the status of cross-Strait relations. Eventually, both Soong and Wang turned down this figurehead position.

The SEF Chairmanship appointment has been delayed 100 days. Instead of progressing, cross-Strait relations have regressed. A long string of incidents have touched sensitive nerves. They include the misfire of a Hsiung Feng III missile in the direction of the Mainland, the South China Sea arbitration adjudication, the deaths of Mainland tourists in a tour bus fire, and the Kenyan telecommunications fraud controversy. Add to this the new government's plummeting approval ratings and political pressure from Taiwan independence elements. The result was President Tsai promptly caved in and appointed Green-oriented Tien Hung-mao as SEF Chairman to appease Taiwan independence elements. Many years ago, Tien Hung-mao reportedly drove Koo Kuan-min all over the US, helping him promote Taiwan independence. Today, a photo of him with former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin hangs in his office. Katherine Chang called his appointment “a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland.” But whether the other side will see it that way is another matter.

Put bluntly, frozen cross-Strait relations, suspended cross-Strait connections, and stalled cross-Strait negotiations have little to do with SEF and MAC appointments. The real problem is Tsai Ing-wen’s incomplete answer sheet to the test. Last year, Tien Hung-mao said that if Tsai Ing-wen refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait communication channels would probably be interrupted. Can Tien Hung-mao mollify Taiwan independence elements? Can he obtain authorization from Tsai Ing-wen to complete the answer sheet? Unless he can, the SEF will remain sitting idling by, and Tien Hung-mao will probably be unable to cross the Strait again.

Strategic errors are difficult to correct at the level of tactics. Tsai Ing-wen may be attempting to stabilize the current situation. But the reduction in Mainland students, the decline in Mainland tourists, and the cancellation of cross-Strait contracts on aquaculture production are the ongoing effects of the impact on cross-Strait relations. Cross-Strait tensions may soon affect diplomacy and economics/trade, including the New Southward Policy. James Huang's appointment at this time reflects another strategic dilemma.

Tsai Ing-wen is anxious to promote her New Southward Policy. That is why she positioned the Office of Southward Policy under the Presidential Office. But for the past several months, little has been implemented apart from sloganeering. In mid August, when the government announced the New Southward Policy, it appeared ready to spring into action. Who knew that half a month later, the political star appointed to head the Southward Policy Office would suddenly be designated to replace Chiang Chun-nan, who was forced to resign a month or so ago for drunk driving. This change sent two messages. The first was that Tsai Ing-wen's bag of tricks is empty. She has no other candidates she can trust, so she transferred James Huang. The second was that the new government realized its New Southward Policy was easier said than done. Therefore, it decided to take advantage of the opportunity provided by personnel changes to change its policy framework.

James Huang has been appointed Representative to Singapore. The Tsai government can of course embellish the move by referring to Singapore as its “command post” to the New South. But can it really? What government is going to allow foreign diplomats to use their country as a command post? If James Huang wants to use Singapore as command post for the New Southward Policy, will men in ROC missions in ASEAN and South Asian countries have to obey his commands or those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? When the two differ on direction and priorities, whom must overseas mission obey? This is akin to moving the Hengshan Command Post to Kinmen, and moving the Chief of General Staff to Tatan Island to take forward command. It is simply not feasible.

The delayed appointments of James Huang and Tien Hung-mao reflect Tsai Ing-wen's internal contradictions in external strategic thinking. That is why this clash between personnel appointments and harsh political reality is so deeply worrisome.

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