The Five Scenarios

A Commentary

The Five Scenarios

                    Source: United Daily News         November 16, 2011

On November 13, the DPP criticized the Mainland for drawing up “five stealthy scenarios” in order to assist the KMT in winning the upcoming Presidential election. On the one hand, the KMT rebutted the DPP’s criticism, saying that it was part of the DPP’s campaign strategy to smear the KMT as pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP). More strangely, the KMT seem to be “chuckling in their sleeves” about the DPP’s criticism. Why is that?  

This is because the KMT has been desperately hoping that the focus of the election campaign would revert to cross-Strait issues. The DPP’s talk of “five stealthy scenarios” reminds voters of two questions. First, why doesn’t Beijing want the DPP to win the election? Second, if the DPP wins, what will cross-Strait relations be like in the future?   

There is no doubt that Beijing does not want the DPP to win the election because the DPP has refused to accept the principle of the “1992 Consensus” and the DPP supports Taiwan independence. According to Wang Yi, director of the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office, if the DPP wins the election, refuses to accept the “1992 Consensus,” and does not give up Taiwan independence, Beijing will stop consultations between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), end talks with Taiwan on an investment guarantees agreement, and reconsider the 16 agreements signed with Taiwan, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Therefore, this dire situation is the last thing Beijing wants to see.  

On the other hand, it is easy to understand why Beijing favors the KMT in the election. Under the spirit of “the 1992 Consensus,” which urges both sides of the Strait to “seek commonality while shelving the differences,” both sides of the Strait put aside political disputes in order to continue economic exchanges and painted a bright future for “peaceful development” across the Strait. Under such circumstances, Beijing does not want to see the hard-earned peace destroyed overnight.      

DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen is wrong to cite the examples of the 1996 cross-Strait missile crisis and then Premier Zhu Rongji’s tough talk against Taiwan in 2000 to explain Beijing’s current stance toward Taiwan. In the examples of the 1996 and 2000 incidents, Beijing was tough in dealing with Taiwan affairs because it wanted to prevent the DPP, a pro-Taiwan independence party, from winning the election. This time, after more than three years of close exchanges across the Strait based on reciprocity, Beijing hopes to continue the peaceful developments.      

Whether or not Beijing is surreptitiously assisting the KMT is something which needs to be proven. However, it is known to all that Beijing does not want the DPP to win in the election. Before Tsai Ing-wen vilifies the KMT as a pro-communist political party, she should first explain to the public why Beijing does not want the DPP to win the election and, most importantly, what cross-Strait relations will be like if the DPP wins.  

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