South China Sea Crisis: Dividends and Risks for Tsai Ing-wen

 South China Sea Crisis: Dividends and Risks for Tsai Ing-wen

United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)

A Translation

June 12, 2015

Executive Summary:

Tsai Ing-wen has concluded her visit to Washington. Her deliberately equivocal pledges to "maintain the status quo" in cross-Strait relations also sailed smoothly under the disguised reference to the "Republic of China's constitutional framework." But her act passed muster not because Tsai Ing-wen is such a wonderful showman. It passed muster because Sino-US relations are strained by tensions in the South China Sea. Tsai Ing-wen's anti-Mainland stance yielded some dividends this time. But her stance on the South China Sea could endanger the Republic of China.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen has concluded her visit to Washington. Her deliberately equivocal pledges to "maintain the status quo" in cross-Strait relations also sailed smoothly under the disguised reference to the "Republic of China's constitutional framework." But her act passed muster not because Tsai Ing-wen is such a wonderful showman. It passed muster because Sino-US relations are strained by tensions in the South China Sea. Tsai Ing-wen's anti-Mainland stance yielded some dividends this time. But her stance on the South China Sea could endanger the Republic of China.

For years now, the United States, the Chinese mainland, and six ASEAN countries have been engaged in a military buildup in the South China Sea. Before the Guang Da Xin incident, the Mainland and the Philippines clashed over the Nansha Islands. The Philippines even filed claims to the UN’s International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea with regard to the islands. In the wake of US military intervention, the Mainland accelerated land reclamation in the area. It said the dispute involved territorial matters, as well as rights and interests; therefore, it would not accept arbitration. It rejected the Philippines' attempt to internationalize the South China Sea dispute.

The basis of jurisprudence for the Mainland to reject the US government's intervention is precisely the "11-Dotted Line" promulgated by the government of the Republic of China in 1947. This U-shaped national boundary in South China Sea clearly delineates the Republic of China's jurisdiction over waters and sovereignty over the islands. In recent years, the United States has hoped the KMT government would renounce the 11-Dotted Line, limit its claim of sovereignty to that over the Taiping Island, or even abandon all these islands. This would enable the US to pressure Mainland China into accepting dispute settlement in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The US has recently dealt with the South China Sea issue in a high-handed manner. This is no accident. It is the inevitable result of China’s rise and the United States' determination to maintain US hegemony over Asia. Mainland China's economic strength poses a threat to American domination over Asia.  Washington's Asian rebalancing policy emphasizes military and regional security. It attempts to contain the Mainland's One Belt, One Road, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other economic alliance strategies. We may easily observe a couple of indicators underscoring the confrontations between the Mainland and the US. One. Early this year, Washington and Tokyo revised the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. They globalized the guidelines. They included the Diaoyutai Islands. Two. Xi Jinping visited Russia. Together with Putin, they reviewed the largest military parade in modern history. Mainland China has allied itself with Russia against the US and Japan. In August of this year, the two countries will hold more joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan.

In the deployment of the two big powers, the US has responded to Mainland China's expanded naval power. The US still adheres to its Cold-War era "first island chain" strategy. The United States and Japan are confronting Mainland China and Russia in Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, the US is using Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries as pawns to inject itself into the South China Seas conflict. Earlier this year, the United States twice asked senior officials of the ROC security directorate to visit the United States to discuss the 11-Dotted Line. Washington later revealed its position through think tanks. Recommendations range from the ROC’s renunciation of the 11-Dotted Line and engagement in dialogue with other claimants. The proposals were attempts to use Taiwan to exert deterrence on the Mainland.

President Ma eventually responded with his "South China Sea Peace Initiative". In a compromise between the Mainland and the US, he stressed shelving the sovereignty dispute while respecting the spirit of international law, maintaining freedom of navigation in the region, and ensuring maritime and air safety. This declaration and US reconnaissance flights over land reclamation on reefs by the Mainland had been in its planning by the US before the "Shangri-La Dialogue" in Singapore in late May. The timing of Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the United States naturally was no coincidence. Mainland China and the US have repeatedly verbally clashed, from the East China Sea to the South China Sea. All these moves are motivated by the desire to empower oneself and disempower the other. It remains in a preliminary stage. During the Sino-US summit in September Xi Jinping and Barack Obama will play the game of chess itself.

The South China Sea dispute has once again highlighted Taiwan's strategic status. Unlike Diaoyutai, Taiping Island is currently under our direct jurisdiction. Responsibility has been transferred to the Coast Guard. This has reduced military connotations and its development was restricted by budget. The discovery of natural gas has renewed government interest, and has led to the resumption of military deployments. Ma government moves in the South China Sea have been suppressed by the US. The most recent affirmation of sovereignty was in 2009. Intense confrontations have taken place among various countries over the past two years. The ROC government, paradoxically, has remained silent and kept a low profile. The Mainland knows the US hopes to undermine Mainland sovereignty in the South China Sea by turning the screws on Taiwan. It has decided therefore to take matters into its own hands. The United States could not persuade Ma to be a pawn. Therefore, it decided to work on the DPP instead. The South China Sea dispute has provided Tsai Ing-wen an opportunity to reverse her fortunes. It has enhanced the strategic status of Taiwan. But what impact will it have on our national prosperity?

The DPP characterizes Ma Ying-jeou's South China Sea peace initiative as "singing the same tune as [Mainland] China". But what about the DPP's South China Sea policy? What is that exactly? The DPP has never made it clear. Tsai Ing-wen held several closed door meetings with the US in Washington. Just exactly what position did she take on the South China Sea disputes? Did she make any secret commitments to the US in exchange for supporting her? The DPP has declared that it will not give up Taiping Island. But the Republic of China's sovereignty in the South China Sea is hardly limited to a single island. What position did Tsai Ing-wen take on the 11-Dotted Line? Did she promise to abandon the islands in accordance with United States wishes? Did she stand by our position of 1947? Before the election, she has been blurring her position in an effort to pander to all parties. But after the election, she will have to say what she really meant. Will a DPP government ally with the US to contain [Mainland] China in order to strengthen its strategic partnership with the latter? Or will it continue the Ma government's policy of maintaining an equidistant posture from the United States and Mainland China, and remain out of the dispute?

Sino-US rivalry is changing the status quo in Asia. The Japanese media described the confrontation between the US and Japan on one side, and Mainland China and Russia on the other, as the beginning of a New Cold War. Regardless whether it is an exaggeration, we should know that Taiwan and the Mainland are already on the road to reconciliation. We must not turn back the clock. Politicians who aspire to greatness, Blue or Green, have a responsibility to explain clearly how they intend to deal with issues concerning sovereignty. They may not treat such matters as bargaining chips to advance their selfish political ambitions. Tsai Ing-wen's position on cross-Strait issues is already far too ambiguous. Her position on the South China Sea issue must be more transparent, if she hopes to become President.

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