“One China, One Interpretation” Is Further Evolution of “One China, Different Interpretations”

 “One China, One Interpretation” Is Further Evolution of “One China, Different Interpretations”

China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)

A Translation

June 29, 2015

Executive Summary:

“One China, One Interpretation,” is not opposed to “One China, Different Interpretations.” It is an evolution of “One China, Different Interpretations.” It is a more logical and intuitive narrative of the cross-Strait relationship. As Hung Hsiu-chu quoted the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, who said, "The times are changing, the environment is changing, the trends are changing," the KMT must not cling to “One China, Different Interpretations.” The 1992 Consensus helped the KMT win the presidency, twice. The time however, has come for a repackaging and upgrade.

Full Text Below:

President Ma Ying-jeou used the 1992 Consensus and “One China, Different Interpretations” as a foundation to establish a “no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force” cross-Strait framework. Over the past seven years, this has enabled the KMT government to make cross-Strait relations more peaceful than they have ever been since 1949. Nevertheless, candidly speaking, changes have taken place inside and outside Taiwan. Mainland China's global influence has increased. Cross-Strait relations have sailed into deep waters. “One China, Different Interpretations” has exhibited fatigue in narrative. It is no longer adequate for policy planning and implementation. Hung Hsiu-chu has made “One China, One Interpretation” and a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement the theme of her 2016 KMT Presidential campaign. This is advancement over “One China, Different Interpretations.” If voters approve and Hung is elected, she will establish a more solid and long-lasting foundation for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

The key to cross-Strait relations is how to handle the dispute over “One China.” Since 1949, the two sides have been separately governed. The dispute has been over who represents China as a whole. During the Cold War, Taipei's position was “good and evil cannot coexist.” During the Lee Teng-hui era, cross-Strait exchanges began. Initially, “One China, Different Interpretations” addressed the question of who represented China as a whole. Later, when Lee moved toward separatism, his Two States Theory abandoned claims to represent China as a whole.

During Chen Shui-bian’s eight years in power, the key was “One State on Either Side.” Relations between the two sides reached new lows. In 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou came to office, the 1992 Consensus and “One China, Different Interpretations” were used to define One China, enabling Taipei and Beijing to start consultations on business matters, and begin large-scale cross-Strait exchanges.

“One China, Different Interpretations” has made historic and functional contributions. But 172 countries around the world have diplomatic relations with Beijing. Only 22 have diplomatic relations with Taipei. Beijing has vastly more global political influence than Taipei. In the long run, “One China, Different Interpretations” is clearly unfavorable to Taipei. Besides, most countries accept the premise that “One China equals the People's Republic of China.” However, we say that the “One China” in “One China, Different Interpretations” means the Republic of China. For this reason, most people on Taiwan dismiss this as KMT self-consolation. Online commentary is rife with younger-generation mockery. “So the other side is the ROC, is it?” “The rest of the world considers One China to be the PRC, does it not?”, “Does the Kuomintang dare make this claim on the Mainland?”, and “Let us ask the CCP to first recognize One China is the ROC.”

Such mockery is consistent with peoples' intuition for the Mainland has long monopolized the claim to represent China as a whole. It has suppressed Taiwan's participation in international activities. Claiming that “One China equals the ROC” leaves one vulnerable to youthful mockery about being Quixotic. As a result, many people on Taiwan perceive “China” as opposed to “Taiwan.” They perceive tilting toward China and being pro-China as “selling out Taiwan.”

In realpolitik terms, “One China, Different Interpretations” is no longer viable in handling cross-Strait political relations. It will be even more detrimental to the future of Taiwan. It worsens the identity crisis among the Taiwan public. The 1992 Consensus clearly needs further deepening. Hung Hsiu-chu champions “One China, One Interpretation.” Specifically, this means that both sides of the Strait are part of China as a whole. Their declared sovereignty overlaps. But their constitutional orders and jurisdictions remain separate.

In plain language, the two sides are two constitutionally-based governments within China as a whole. Cross-Strait relations are neither international relations nor domestic affairs of one side. They are domestic relations within China as a whole. 

“One China, One Interpretation” is clear and reasonable. It is an evolution of “One China, Different Interpretations,” rather than an alienation of it. It can ensure peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. It can resolve public contention over national identity. “One China, One Interpretation” provides an answer to netizens’ intuitive questioning over “One China, Different Interpretations.” It also provides intuitive responses: “The Himalayas have the highest peak in China as a whole. The highest peak in the region under ROC government jurisdiction, on the other hand, is Yushan.” By the same token, the art treasures in the National Palace Museums on both sides of the Strait belong to China as a whole. They are the shared property of both Taipei and Beijing. But the National Palace Museum in Taipei is under the control of the Taipei government. The Forbidden City in Beijing, meanwhile, is under the control of the Beijing government.

When “One China, One Interpretation” is consistent with people's gut level understanding, it then can make the KMT's cross-Strait rhetoric convincing. It can enable Hung Hsiu-chu to champion her other concept – a Cross-Strait Peace Agreement. It can give such an agreement more convincing legitimacy. To normalize cross-Strait relations, we must sign a peace agreement. It can enable Taiwan to participate in international activities. It can change the hostile relations between Taiwan and the Mainland from the angles of legal system and national policy. It can fully normalize cross-Strait relations on the basis of rule of law, national security, and domestic policy. A Cross-Strait Peace Agreement is actually part of Lien and Hu's Five Visions. It is their most important consensus. Yet the KMT has been cowed by the Green Camp. It is paralyzed, terrified of defending this idea. Now, however, is the time to realize this vision.

“One China, One Interpretation,” is not opposed to “One China, Different Interpretations.” It is an evolution of “One China, Different Interpretations.” It is a more logical and intuitive narrative of the cross-Strait relationship. As Hung Hsiu-chu quoted the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, who said, “The times are changing, the environment is changing, the trends are changing,” the KMT must not cling to “One China, Different Interpretations.” The 1992 Consensus helped the KMT win the presidency, twice. The time however, has come for a repackaging and upgrade.

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