Coming Out from Korean War Shadow, Resolutely Say No to North Korea
2017/05/03
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Coming Out from Korean War Shadow, Resolutely Say No to North Korea
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
April 26, 2017
Translation of an Except
Oblivious to pressure from all sides, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un regime struck a posture of "strength relying on nuclear arms" and stated that it possessed hydrogen bombs that could attack the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, claiming that it was prepared to launch air raids on US aircraft carriers. At the same time, it exchanged barbs with Beijing, rejecting the good offices of the Mainland’s special envoy, and even brazenly detained a Korean-American citizen. However, in the end North Korea did not proceed with the test-fire of its 6th nuclear bomb on its Army Day, allowing the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea to heave a sigh of relief. This time the fact that the world was able to temporarily sail through the North Korean nuclear crisis had much to do with the intensive hotline coordination between the heads of state of the US and China, and China’s active participation, showing that Beijing has come out of the historical shadow of the Korean War, starting to co-manage the North Korean crisis with the United States.
Trump phoned Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Abe separately, leading various circles to believe that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons was an imminent threat. Xi Jinping called on all parties to exercise restraint, but agreed to strengthen cooperation in making the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. Trump also invited all US senators to the White House to be briefed by the Secretary of State, Defense Secretary, National Security Adviser, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in order to be better prepared in the case of the outbreak of war.
At the same time, Beijing apparently also made corresponding preparations. Mainland official media have criticized more than once and manifested that Beijing would not tolerate Pyongyang to engage in nuclear and guided missile activities, urging Pyongyang to forsake as soon as possible its closed-door path, and warned that if North Korea should proceed with its 6th nuclear test, Beijing must be well-prepared to face the war. Li Zhanshu, chef de cabinet of the CCP Party Central, embarked on a visit to Russia at this sensitive moment, showing that Beijing was revving its engine in an attempt to suppress North Korea's brute fever in developing nuclear arms.
Especially once the crisis got out of control, even if it did not ignite an all-out war involving China, it could possibly lead to turmoil in North Korea, causing hordes of refugees to flow into China and nuclear contamination in the northern regions of China. What is even more unthinkable was that if South Korea and Japan should be forced to develop nuclear arms, it definitely was not a development Beijing would be willing to see.
However, the North Korean crisis also gave China an opportunity to exhibit its strength as a big power and to shoulder the responsibility of a big power. Beijing should abandon its traditional security view of geopolitics, overcoming the historical complex of the Korean War, much less misjudging that North Korea was a kid brother who would listen to Beijing’s views. For its self-interest, Beijing must more actively adopt measures, exhibiting resoluteness, and expressly telling Kim Jong-un that developing nuclear arms was a dead-end.
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