“Facing Malfunction in System, Democracy, and Taiwan Itself” Series 1: Erecting a New Cross-Strait Framework to Extricate Taiwan from its Predicament

  “Facing Malfunction in System, Democracy, and Taiwan Itself” Series 1

  Erecting a New Cross-Strait Framework to Extricate Taiwan from its Predicament

China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan)

August 24, 2017

 Translation of an Excerpt

On the eve of the Mainland’s 19^th CCP National Party Congress, some subtle indications have appeared in cross-Strait relations. Official interactions have been suspended, but some positive developments have begun to appear. Officials of the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office have entered Taiwan without a hitch, and have appeared in public occasions. Although the Mainland has not lifted the ban on contacts and interactions between its official think tanks and the Green camp’s counterparts, it has, on the other hand, begun interactions with private sector think tank scholars of DPP-affiliation, or made contact and socialized with DPP figures through private luncheons or dinners. In other words, although the Mainland and the DPP don’t interact, the door is not shut for interactions with DPP members.

Insofar as the Tsai government is concerned, in order to improve cross-Strait relations, it can never be realized through expressions of goodwill alone. The greatest obstacle for interchanges between the DPP and the CCP is the lack of mutual trust; hence, it is very difficult to achieve an adequate understanding. The number one priority of the Tsai government is to adopt practical actions in order to accumulate mutual trust between the DPP and CCP so that both sides of the Strait can truly take steps of mutual interaction of substance.

After over 30 years of reform and opening up, the Mainland has been developing with rapid speed; it has become a big power with global influence. Taiwan no longer has the political and economic strength to counter the Mainland; the national clout of the United States is also showing signs of fatigue, and the US needs, even more, to cooperate with China. More importantly, the Mainland government is also facing the pressure of time for cross-Strait reunification; it is feeling increasingly impatient with the situation that the cross-Strait problem has not been resolved for so long.

In the context of China’s relations with the world today, Taiwan's current inward-thinking cross-Strait policy will only lock up itself, becoming more and more isolated and more and more destitute; it must, with an open mind, cooperate with the Mainland, and determine Taiwan’s position in this cooperation, shaping an advantage in negotiations with the Mainland.

President Tsai's room for maneuvering has become very small, but she can still return to the historical fact of the 1992 talks, recognizing that the two sides of the Strait, at the time, both insisted on the one China principle, thus she can circumvent the dispute over the content of one China. At the same time, President Tsai can also consider giving a new assessment of the Ma-Xi Summit. If President Tsai can make changes in these two things, perhaps she can find a new direction for the road of her cross-Strait policies, and she can firmly erect a new framework for cross-Strait relations in the new era.

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