How Does a Divided Taiwan Counter a Powerful China?

  How Does a Divided Taiwan Counter a Powerful China?

United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan)

October 19, 2017

 Translation of an Excerpt

At the opening of the "19th National People’s Congress of the Communist Party of China" yesterday, when Xi Jinping talked about cross-Strait relations, besides his insistence on the "one China" principle and the 1992 Consensus, pushing for cross-Strait "peaceful development" and strengthening cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation, he reiterated his resolute opposition and suppression of the splittist forces of Taiwan independence. There was a hard-line in the otherwise soft remarks of Xi Jinping; besides erasing the rumors of “military conquest of Taiwan” with "cross-Strait peaceful development," Xi Jinping referred to the "1992 Consensus" four times to remind Tsai Ying-wen to return to the "status quo." Thus, we can see that for the past one and a half years, Tsai Ying-wen has attempted to take over the initiative in cross-Strait relations, but in fact has been unable to shake any situation; conversely, she has mired Taiwan in the embarrassing situation of divergences.

If we say that Tsai Ing-wen was “courageous” to refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus last year, at the time at least she was wearing a halo of electoral victory, believing she acted with support. Today, when the ship of cross-Strait relations is stranded on the rocks and Tsai Ying-wen still did not know to change course, apparently she is someone ridiculous who does not know when to make changes, because she does not know whither to lead the nation. Among the arrows she shot in the area of cross-Strait policies, not one hit the enemy, but rather wounding many in Taiwan internally.

Observing the cross-Strait remarks made by Xi Jinping yesterday, Beijing used "peaceful development" to wipe out the dust of "reunification by military force" which had been widely rumored recently, used the "1992 Consensus" to retain for Tsai Ing-wen some room for maneuvering, and also to retain goodwill for the exchanges during the Ma government era. From the 18^th to 19^th Congress, five years apart, the contrast of the waxing and waning of the two sides of the Strait is obvious; it also reflects the sense of crisis with a disappearing edge and niche of Taiwan. Apparently, Taiwan no longer has any room to waste time. A powerful authoritarian government may be dreadful, but what is more dreadful is that Taiwan does not try to strengthen itself, but rather endlessly engages in self-rupturing and self-wearing and tearing. If President Tsai reviews what she has called a "new situation" and takes a look at the "new questionnaire" she proposed, could she think of a “new model”?

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