Taiwan's Chinese Identity Still Profound and Solid

  Taiwan's Chinese Identity Still Profound and Solid

China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan)

October 17, 2017

 Translation of an Excerpt

The Taiwan Competitiveness Forum released its "Taiwan Public National Identity Survey for the Second Half of 2017." There are many points in the survey results that merit pondering, as they may allow both sides of the Strait to think jointly about the truthful chart of identity of Taiwanese status and the national identity, and use it as a basis to judge when making the best cross-Strait policies.

This survey may be analyzed from two perspectives, i.e., "the emotional facet of status identity" and "the rational facet of future judgments." On the "emotional facet of status identity," if one is bluntly asked whether he/she considers him/herself Chinese, 50.2% of the respondents considered themselves as "Chinese," while 44.7% do not. However, if the options of "Chinese" and "Taiwanese" are placed together, and one is asked about the identity pertaining to "the relationship between Taiwanese and Chinese," then 24.7% consider themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese; 10% consider themselves as Taiwanese and may also be Chinese; 28.6%, however, consider themselves as Taiwanese, but it is not necessary to deny they are Chinese; 32.4% consider themselves as Taiwanese and not Chinese. In comparison with the straightforward question “Are you Chinese?”-- to which 50.2% identified as Chinese-- when modifiers are added in the question, the "pan-Chinese identity" increases to 63.3%.

If the natural judgment involving "analysis of advantages and disadvantages" is further added, when asked about what kind of relationship that "can both safeguard Taiwan's interests and is conducive to cross-Strait peaceful development," then "pan-Chinese identity" is further raised to 66.7%, while those who insist they are Taiwanese and not Chinese further decreases to 26.2%.

If analyzed from the "rational facet," it not only shows the emotional facet of status identity, but also shows the pragmatic rationality of Taiwanese vis-à-vis the future of cross-Strait relations and the possibilities of reunification and independence, the survey results are hugely different. When asked about the cross-Strait contrast of strengths, 68.1% indicate that "the Mainland is far stronger than Taiwan," while 11.8% indicate that "the Mainland’s strength may be greater than that of Taiwan, but not by much," 7.7% indicate that "Taiwan's strength is comparable to that of the Mainland" and 3.5% indicate that "Taiwan's strength is greater than that of the Mainland." This "pragmatic" perception of the facet of strength has shaped the "future judgment" of Taiwanese vis-à-vis the issue of reunification versus independence. That is, if both sides of the Strait could not maintain the status quo, 55.4% of the public on Taiwan consider the chances of "cross-Strait reunification are great," while only 26.6% consider the chances of "Taiwan independence are great."

When we link the analyses from the two facets, the real Taiwan is, in fact, not the same as the one people think. The premise determining a correct cross-Strait policy is the accurate grasp of people’s hearts and popular will. From the survey conducted by the Taiwan Competitiveness Forum, we may know that from the cross-Strait optimistic level, the compatibility of the emotional and status identity are far more profound and solid than seen on the surface. Only by grasping this kind of optimism, not misjudging the situation, and dissolving the sense of anxiety existing amongst the populace, can we find a foundation for peaceful coexistence, cooperation and development is, in fact, the royal road of practice for the great renaissance of the Chinese nation.

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