Taiwan and Japan “Compatible But Not the Same”

 Taiwan and Japan “Compatible But Not the Same”

United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan)

September 11, 2018

 Translation of an Excerpt

A couple of days ago, President Tsai received the “Cross-Strait Relations Study Group" of Tokyo University, and talked about the ever-stronger suppression against us by the Mainland, while Taiwan and Japan share common values ​​and concepts; she hoped that both parties could cooperate to expand markets in third countries. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry also allocated a budget of NT$15 million as funds for promoting Taiwan’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP), and for lobbying relevant member states to help Taiwan join the second round of CPTPP talks, adding that for this we rely on Japan's assistance. It may be seen from this that regardless of how the international situation changes, the Tsai government will still consider "coalescing with Japan to counter China" as the primary melody in diplomacy.

What may possibly be overlooked by the Tsai government is that following the changes in US trade and diplomatic strategy, including President Trump’s pronouncement that he would zero in on Japan as the next target of the trade war, the Japanese government, both realistic and pragmatic, is quietly shifting gears and gradually cozying up to China. In a nutshell, with the changing situation, an air of “compatible but not the same” has emerged in the concept of Taiwan-Japan "joint confrontation against China." On this point, if Frank Hsieh, Taiwan’s representative to Japan, had not reported to President Tsai based on facts, then this would be dereliction of duty or deceiving his superior.

In fact, since the beginning of the year, Japanese political figures have been visiting Beijing one after another; Shinzo Abe’s secretary, Takaya Imai, brought a personal letter from Abe to Xi Jinping. This is the first time that the Japanese government manifested its attitude with action, showing its strong interest in the "One Belt, One Road" launched by the Mainland. At the end of August, Abe’s political confidant, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Taro Aso, personally attended the 7^th “China-Japan Fiscal Dialogue” held in Beijing. At the meeting, a consensus was reached to jointly strive for the economy, paving the way for Abe’s visit to China next month. It thus may be seen that taking advantage of the opportunity of the 40^th anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship to achieve normalization of bilateral relations between China and Japan has become the top priority of Abe.

Seen from these developments, Japan's "Looking West Policy" adopted for the purpose of upgrading China-Japan relations, in addition to the needs for strategic shifting, also has considerations for domestic economic needs. Amid the atmospherics of Japan actively nurturing a "Abe-Xi summit," the Taiwan card will be a political issue that Japan could not evade. It may be foreseen that Japan's strength to counter China would become more and more feeble, and Japan would be more prudent on the question of Taiwan’s joining the CPTPP. Thus, it may be foreseen that the Taiwan-Japan alliance of values would be even more "compatible but not the same."

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