Does the US Support Tsai Ing-wen for Re-Election?
2019/02/23
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Does the US Support Tsai Ing-wen for Re-Election?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan)
February 20, 2019
Translation of an Excerpt
President Tsai Ing-wen through an exclusive interview with CNN on the 19th indicated that she would seek re-election in 2020. In 2016, the US did clear-cutly suppor Tsai Ing-wen running for president; at the time, Tsai Ing-wen had clear-cutly announced that she would not change the status quo of the constitutional government system of the Republic of China. Three years later, the status quo has changed in many ways; will the United States continue to support her?
We could cut in by referring to the two recent concerns and caveats to the ruling and opposition parties in Taiwan by former AIT chairman Richard Bush: One is opposition to President Tsai Ing-wen addressing the US Congress, urging Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi not to rashly issue an invitation. Two is writing an open letter to Kuo Pei-hung (郭倍宏), chairman of the Formosa Alliance, expressing concern and advice vis-à-vis the plebiscite proposal on Taiwan independence. The American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei Office followed up by indicating that it did not support the plebiscite proposal on Taiwan independence. They revealed many messages worthy of exploration.
The US and China have established diplomatic relations for 40 years; the US has never changed its cross-Strait policy, i.e., on the one hand, it maintains formal diplomacy and comprehensive official relations with the Chinese Mainland, while on the other hand, through the Taiwan Relations Act, it continues to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons and develops unofficial economic-trade, social, cultural and other relations, and through executive power and judicial power, it accepts the substantive status of governance of Taiwan authorities. Despite the close and frequent US-Taiwan exchanges, the United States, however, has never recognized the sovereign status of Taiwan as a state, so much so the segregation between the government and the private sector, as well as the demarcation between sovereignty and jurisdiction have been delineated absolutely and extremely clearly.
For this reason, the US’s supreme strategy of the long-term interests is very clear-cut; the US affirms and supports Taiwan’s democracy and freedom, but the United States does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, there being no confusion between the two. For the US to express opposition to the plebiscite proposal on Taiwan independence is a solemn warning to the DPP government not to cross the red line and do something abrasive in violation of US interests while its 2020 election campaign prospects deteriorate.
Looking in the short term, the United States may be inclined to support Tsai Ing-wen's re-election bid, but there are still three variables: One, the DPP's substantive steps, and whether the DPP would exceed the scope delineated by the US in the election campaign. Two, if the dynamic relationship between China and the US marches on a stable path, the United States needs China's support, and its support for Tsai Ing-wen will probably weaken. Three, with Han Kuo-yu’s soaring prospects, if the KMT’s prospects approach or even exceed those of the DPP, the US will be inclined to remain neutral.
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