Communiqué of 1982 and Reagan’s assurances

Communiqué of 1982 and Reagan’s assurances

The China Post editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
June 18, 2007


Four documents are cited as collectively the legal foundation of U.S. China policy. Aside from the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, they include the Shanghai communiqué of 1972, President Jimmy Carter’s normalization agreement with the People’s Republic of China, and the August 18, 1982, communiqué limiting U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

The four documents are not consistent, however. In fact, they often contradict each other. It is difficult to argue that there is continuity, much less a legal consistency, in U.S. China policy when one reads the four documents. They were written by different organs of government, at different times, for different purposes. They are different documents legally and otherwise.

From a legal standpoint, the August 17 communique is the weakest. It was not signed or even initialed. Moreover, President Ronald W. Reagan stated that the communiqué was predicated on the assumption that the People’s Republic of China agreed to a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue.

Alexander Haig, Reagan’s first secretary of state, ushered in the communiqué but the Department of State, after he stepped down, declared that the document does not provide the termination of arms sales to Taiwan – because the Taiwan Relations Act, though a domestic law, stipulates the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

The article contradicting the Taiwan Relations Act reads: “Having in mind the foregoing statement of both sides (on détente), the United States Government stated that it did not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan; that its arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China; that it intended gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time, to a final resolution. The United States acknowledged China’s consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.”

Why did Haig make such a concession?

What caused Haig to capitulate was a point-blank threat from Beijing. Huang Hua, Chinese foreign minister, threatened to reduce the level of representation between Beijing and Washington if the Reagan administration should honor its commitment toward Taipei as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act.

Earlier in 1981, Beijing made the same threat when the Dutch government was considering the sale of arms to Taiwan, including two submarines. It didn’t work. Taiwan acquired the two Dutch-built conventional submarines. Relations between the Netherlands and China were not downgraded.

On January 11, 1982, the Reagan administration informed Taipei of its decision not to sell any advanced aircraft to Taiwan, albeit it would replace F-5E fighters with comparable aircraft. This was a concession to Beijing which was also informed of this decision since it had made an issue of this matter by threatening to downgrade relations with Washington. But Beijing refused to be mollified. Instead it kept up its pressure on the Reagan administration.

Reagan took the unusual step of writing three personal letters to Chinese leaders. In the first of them, addressed to Deng Xiaoping and dated April 5, Reagan wrote: “The United States firmly adheres to the positions agreed upon in the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China. There is only one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle.”

That is tantamount to giving Beijing a veto power on future Washington-Taipei relations.

In the letter to Zhao Zhiyang, the then Chinese premier, Reagan promised that “in the context of progress toward a peaceful solution, there would naturally be a decrease in the need for arms by Taiwan.” In a third letter, Reagan told Hu Yaobang, the late Chinese Communist Party general-secretary his vice president George W. Bush would “discuss in his April 23-May 9 visit to Peking … the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.”

Meanwhile, President Reagan made known to Taipei through appropriate channels what are known as the six assurances. He assured President Chiang Ching-kuo that the United States:
1) Has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan;
2) Has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese Communists on arms sales to Taiwan;
3) Will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing;
4) Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
5) Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and
6) Will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Communists.

These assurances were not written into an agreement or a joint communiqué. In fact, Reagan just wanted to dispel any doubt in Taipei that the United States might have sacrificed Taiwan’s national interests by giving that concession in the August 17 communique. That’s why all “assurances” except the third and the last were expressed in the present perfect tense. The two assurances expressed in the future tense may be considered promises Reagan gave Chiang Ching-kuo in private.

On last Thursday, however, President Chen Shui-bian, who did not quite understand what these assurances were, openly questioned whether the U.S. government renounced what he believes is Reagan’s assurance of not altering “its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” Chen met Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, at his office and criticized the United States for “not maintaining its stance (on sovereignty over Taiwan) and allowing the OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) to denigrate Taiwan’s status of participation (as a sovereign country member).” The OIE has changed Taiwan’s status to a “non-sovereign regional member” with the official title of Chinese Taipei.

Reagan did not assure Chiang Ching-kuo that the United States would not “alter its position” vis-à-vis Taiwan’s sovereignty. All he indicated was that the United States did not change its long-held stance in agreeing to reduce American arms sales to Taiwan. Washington, on the other hand, has kept the two promises Reagan made in the private memorandum: no mediation between Taipei and Beijing and no pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.



(Courtesy of the China Post)

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