Mutual Trust First, Diplomatic Affairs Second

Mutual Trust First, Diplomatic Affairs Second

(A Commentary - By Edward Chen)

Source: United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.)

May 12, 2008

President-elect Ma Ying-jeou said the recent Taiwan-Papua New Guinea diplomatic scandal has taught the nation the important lesson that a diplomatic truce between Taiwan and Mainland China is needed for Taiwan to launch any kind of pragmatic diplomacy. Ma also spoke of the need to combine diplomatic work with cross-Strait negotiations. While Ma is right in raising these ideas, a diplomatic truce is easier said than done. It would be more sensible to discuss economic and trade issues first to build up mutual trust and rapport before talking about diplomatic and political issues.

Ma raised the ideas of “modus vivendi,” “flexible diplomacy,” and “cross-Strait mutual non-denial” prior to the Presidential election. In his first international press conference after his election, Ma reiterated that he would authorize the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to open talks with the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in Mainland China on cross-Strait economic and trade issues and the more sensitive political issues on the basis of the “1992 Consensus, i.e., One China, Different Interpretations.”

In response to PRC President Hu Jintao’s recent state visit to Japan, Ma said in public that Hu’s trip to Japan would be conducive to maintaining peace and stability in Asia Pacific. Ma also raised the idea of a diplomatic truce once again in order to remind Mainland China that “there is no need for it to sabotage Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with other countries since it already has 171 diplomatic allies.” Apparently Ma wants to adopt a softer attitude toward Mainland China to call a diplomatic truce and create new opportunities for diplomatic breakthroughs for Taiwan, especially since Paraguay might be the next in line to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

However, if one takes a closer look at the following aspects, it becomes clear that Ma would make waste if he hastens to activate the SEF-ARATS negotiation mechanism upon his inauguration and treats diplomatic breakthroughs and cross-Strait negotiations as the same thing in order to achieve the goal of diplomatic truce.

First of all, while Hu did note in his reiteration of the four-point guidelines that Mainland China would be willing to open talks on any subject with Taiwan, including Taiwan’s diplomatic activities, as long as the latter acknowledges the 1992 Consensus. However, Hu did not guarantee that the talks would yield any concrete results or lead to any positive outcome anytime soon. Diplomatic and political negotiations do not render success overnight.

Secondly, Vice President-elect Vincent Siew and the Mainland Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming jointly hosted the Boao roundtable meeting in mid April. However, the Mainland Chinese Ministry of Commerce unilaterally issued a press release after the meeting pledging to construct a platform for communication and negotiation “under the One-China Principle.” This shows that while Hu spoke in favor of the “1992 Consensus,” the PRC government still stands by the “One-China Principle.” In his meeting with President Chen Shui-bian on April 1, Ma said Taiwan and Mainland China must go back to the basis of the 1992 Consensus in order to have positive interactions. Ma said he would not open talks with Mainland China if the latter would not allow for “different interpretations” of “one China.” Beijing is extremely likely to back out and throw cross-Strait negotiations into an impasse if the SEF and ARATS hasten to open talks on sensitive issues.

Thirdly, it would be impossible for Beijing to stop pressurizing Taiwan on the diplomatic front in the near future. It would encounter mounting difficulties if both sides should open talks on issues like “diplomatic truce,” “mutual non-denial,” “Taiwan’s space in the international community,” “cross-Strait common market,” and “Taiwan’s participation in the ASEAN free trade zone” any time soon, not to mention more sensitive issues including “military confidence-building measures” and “peace agreement.”

As a matter of fact, Beijing is not prepared psychologically or substantively to open talks with Taipei, and Taipei is equally ill prepared in the following aspects: (1) Taiwan has yet to form a majority consensus. (2) Mutual trust has yet to take shape. (3) More time is needed to create rapport for cross-Strait political negotiations. (4) There are not enough cross-Strait negotiation specialists.

Since both sides are not exactly ready for either diplomatic or political negotiations, it would be more sensible to take it step by step and focus negotiations on economic and trade issues first and gradually build up mutual trust and rapport throughout the negotiation process. It would be better to use negotiations to cultivate high-quality experts specializing in international affairs, cross-Strait affairs, and negotiation. Negotiations on diplomatic affairs can begin after this is completed. Highly sensitive issues such as military affairs and government should be discussed only after there is some concrete form of mutual trust and rapport.

The spirit of taking it step by step can be applied to building mutual trust between Taiwan and Mainland China, developing negotiation specialists, and the setting of agenda in negotiations. It can also come in handy in forming a majority consensus among the people on Taiwan. In this respect, taking it step by step might happen to be the greatest challenge ahead.

Attachment : none