Crisis and Opportunity: Conflict Management in the Taiwan Strait

Crisis and Opportunity:
Conflict Management in the Taiwan Strait
Ma Ying-jeou

(A speech delivered at the International Symposium on Conflict Management and Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations, sponsored by National Chengchi University on March 12, 2007, in Taipei, Taiwan)

As many observers have pointed out, cross-Strait issues concern not only the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, but also the foreign policies of nations in the Asia-Pacific region, because it may be the only issue that could provoke war between the United States, the world's only remaining superpower, and Communist China, which has the world's largest population. If war were to break out, not only would regional trade and development be brought to a halt, nations in the region might be forced to choose between supporting or resisting the Chinese Communists, precipitating long-term structural changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific region.

At a deeper level, I would especially like to point out three major negative developments affecting the security of both sides of the Taiwan Strait in the past several years.

First, the rapid and large-scale development of Communist Chinese military forces. In November 2006, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, established by order of the US Congress, made public its annual congressional report. One of its main conclusions was: "Many experts have already arrived at an important consensus, that between 2008 and 2015, if a conflict arises, or tension increases between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the US decides that it must assist Taiwan, the United States military will experience a Window of Vulnerability." In other words, many of Mainland China’s Taiwan-oriented military modernization plans, including submarines, destroyers, cruise missiles, as well as high-mobility ballistic missiles, new-style Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaisance Systems (C4ISR), as well as attack plans, may all be deployed around 2008, or shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, the measures that the United States military may take to hinder the Chinese Communists, including guided missile defense systems, nearshore offense capabilities, as well as comprehensive antisubmarine warfare networks, may not have adequate strength until 2015. This will seriously reduce the ability of American military forces to intimidate Mainland China, and simultaneously increase the cost of US intervention.

Secondly, since 2000, the ruling DPP has never attempted to establish any form of relations with the newly-awaken Dragon of the East. Even more disadvantageous is the fact that the DPP stops at nothing to provoke Mainland China, and frequently manufactures tensions between the latter and the US. One week ago, President Chen made yet another shocking statement: "Taiwan must become independent! Taiwan demands a new constitution! Taiwan must carry out the Rectification of Names! Taiwan must have economic development!" Since 2002, as we can see, Chen Shui-bian has set off a series of bombshells: "one country on each side," "plebiscite," "writing a new constitution," "the balance of terror," as well as "abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification," and until recently, "Four Yeses and One No." Many analysts think the DPP has already begun pursuing "de jure Taiwan independence." Because of election considerations, such a development may determine Taiwan's political climate for the coming year. Whether this development leads to tensions between the two sides of the Strait is not something that concerns either Chen Shui-bian or the DPP in the slightest.

Thirdly, despite the hardline standoff between their governments, people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to establish close economic and cultural relations. This, in today's world, is a unique phenomenon. However, the DPP government turns a blind eye to the economic and cultural needs of millions of people on Taiwan who travel, trade, invest, and receive education on the mainland. In other countries, such exchanges and activities are fundamental to market liberalization and globalization, but some DPP political figures actually denounce such exchanges and activities as "selling out Taiwan." Even sadder, when people from Taiwan struggle alone on the outside, all they hear is insults and criticisms about "selling out Taiwan." This has cut them to the quick and demeaned their feelings for Taiwan. Their alienation has in turn strengthened the DPP's contempt for their struggle for both economic and human advancement. In addition, such a vicious cycle has created significant internal fissures within Taiwan's society. One positive development, amidst the above three major negative developments, is that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have experienced a rapid increase in economic and cultural exchanges over the past several years. According to figures published by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), cross-Strait trade between 1987 and 2006 had already amounted to US$ 562.4 billion. As for the proportion of cross-Strait trade, Taiwan comprises approximately 5% of the mainland's trade, while the mainland accounts for 20% of Taiwan's trade.

Over the past ten years, Taiwan has enjoyed a favorable trade surplus of US$ 244 billion with the mainland. Taking only 2006 (up to November) as an example, cross-Strait trade volume exceeded US$ 80 billon, including the export of US$ 57 billion and the import of US$ 23 billion. In other words, Taiwan enjoyed a favorable balance of US$ 34 billion. At the same time, Taiwan's total world trade surplus was only US$ 18.3 billion. In other words, without the mainland market, Taiwan would already have had a trade deficit. In terms of investments, according to Ministry of Economic Affairs figures, as of 2006 Taipei had already authorized 35,542 cases of investments on the mainland totaling US$ 54.9 billion. Taiwan has become Mainland China’s largest investor, accounting for 67.35% of Taiwan's total outside investments. Beijing's official figures show that since 1991, Taiwan has made at least 72,285 cases of investments on the mainland, amounting to US$ 100 billion. In 2006, the total remittances between Taiwan and Mainland China amounted to US$ 180 billion, nearly ten times the amount in 2002. That is why I refer to this trend as a positive development, instead of what the DPP calls a "hollowing out of the economy," not merely because it is a contribution to Taiwan's economy, but because it is helpful to the stabilization of cross-Strait relations. For example, Taiwan's outpouring of investments and human resources on the mainland have undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the mainland's economic development. Therefore, Chinese authorities, at either the central or local levels, all appreciate the role Taiwan's business people have played in enhancing mainland economic development, career opportunities, and the upgrading of technology.

Close exchanges across the Taiwan Strait have also helped each side to understand the other's anxieties, expectations, and constraints. As a result of direct contacts, Taiwan's elites and public can begin to appreciate Mainland China's political system and ideological principles and constraints. At the same time, more and more mainland elites and people at large can better understand Taiwan's system of democracy and its lively political activities. The above, I believe, can be helpful to the long-term benefit of Taiwan as well as Mainland China.

In my opinion, Mainland China is not exclusively a threat, it is also an opportunity. If, as many DPP public figures insist, we treat Mainland China exclusively as a threat, then we will be misled and unable to discover the opportunities it has to offer. Similarly, if we regard Mainland China exclusively as an opportunity, that is also a mistake. The mainland is simultaneously a threat and an opportunity. This will be the case for a long time to come.

In order to resist the Chinese Communist threat, Taiwan should adopt a kind of "Two-pronged Strategy."

First, on the basis of the “1992 Consensus”, or "One China, Separate Interpretations," Taiwan should re-establish the dialogue with the mainland government that was interrupted in 1999. By means of dialogue, both sides of the Taiwan Strait may be able, by direct contact, to negotiate a modus vivendi that allows Taiwan more space and the opportunity to participate in international activities. Once both sides of the Taiwan Strait have established sufficient trust and good will, we may even be able to look forward to a negotiated peace agreement.

Next, in order to resist Mainland Chinese threats, the ROC must also maintain a solid national defense. But we do not agree with the DPP's view that Taiwan should develop an "offensive approach to national defense." An offensive approach to national defense would not be feasible unless Taiwan develops weapons of mass destruction (WMD), otherwise any other deterrent would have no real effect. The danger of an "offensive approach to national defense" is that it would undoubtedly invite international intervention, even a mainland pre-emptive strike.

We believe that Taiwan’s national defense posture should be to arm ourselves only to the point where Mainland China cannot be confident of a successful "first strike." As long as the mainland cannot be confident that it can achieve such a goal, its strategic calculations will remain difficult, and the temptation to launch a surprise attack will be diminished. In order to become "a nut too tough to crack," Taiwan should carry out national defense reforms while simultaneously purchasing advanced weapon systems from abroad.

Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the mainland also allows us to adopt another "Two-pronged Strategy." On the one hand, both sides should sit down and reach an agreement on direct flights and shipping. Not only would this immediately and significantly increase cross-Strait economic activities, it would also promote the first large-scale direct contacts in cross-Strait history. The impact on economic and cultural exchanges would be enormous. The political impact would also be beneficial; we could simultaneously forsee a reduction of the danger of war.

But, direct links would not merely bring positive results for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. They would also help safeguard investments, promote joint crime-fighting, intellectual property rights protection, and other outstanding issues, long neglected by the DPP's "Three Noes" (no contacts, no negotiations, no compromises) policy.

I agree whole-heartedly with the necessity of "conflict management" across the Taiwan Strait. The key word being "management." Overseas visitors may not realize that the DPP government defines cross-Strait relations as a "reunification vs. independence issue." I emphatically disagree with this definition. Because no matter whether one is pro-reunification or pro-independence, neither conforms to the current wishes of the majority of people on Taiwan. According to numerous surveys, even officially-sponsored surveys, the results show that many of those who "identify with Taiwan" do not support Taiwan independence.

As the proverb goes, "God helps those who help themselves." I believe that the double "Two-pronged Strategy" offers a good start for Taiwan. Only by blazing a new trail and setting a new precedent, can we establish peace and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait.

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