Without “1992 Consensus,” Cross-Strait Talks Will Break Down

A Commentary

Without “1992 Consensus,” Cross-Strait Talks Will Break Down

Chao, Chun-Shan

(Professor of Mainland China Studies at Tamkang University)

Source: United Daily News           

January 5, 2011 

As the 2012 Presidential election campaign approaches and the DPP mulls adjusting its Mainland policy, debate over cross-Strait policy is taking center stage, which inevitably focuses on the “1992 Consensus.”

As everyone knows, back in 1992, the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Mainland-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) wanted a breakthrough in the impasse in cross-Strait consultations held in Hong Kong, so they reached a consensus on how to resolve critical differences and avoid pitfalls. Currently, the people who doubt the existence of the “1992 Consensus” stress the term “consensus” and ignore the functional and political meaning of the “1992 Consensus.” If the consensus did not include “one China, different interpretations,” then it would have been impossible for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to shelve differences on sovereignty issues, and the two sides would not have been able to reach any cross-Strait agreements, or to hold the historic “Koo-Wang talks” [Koo Chen-fu was then chairman of the SEF and Wang Daohan was then chairman of the ARATS.]

The foundation of the “1992 Consensus” is “one China, different interpretations,” albeit the Mainland highlights “one China” while Taiwan stresses “different interpretations.” Both sides have chosen to shelve differences on sovereignty issues, each taking what they need from the “1992 Consensus.”

President Ma Ying-jeou has called on DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen to explain her party’s standpoint on “one China, different interpretations.” Actually, when we talk about “one China, different interpretations,” we are merely reiterating the Constitutional framework of the Republic of China (ROC). When the DPP doubts the existence of the “1992 Consensus,” does the DPP also doubt the existing Constitutional framework of the Republic of China?

Some people have criticized President Ma for treating the “1992 Consensus” as a “paper ancestral tablet.” However, it is obvious that these people ignore the fact that the “1992 Consensus” is an evolving concept, which may further evolve, and they disregard its functional value in the process of promoting cross-Strait consultations and negotiations. We believe that President Ma is no different from the majority of people in Taiwan. In his heart of hearts, the only “ancestral tablet” is the Republic of China. Over the two years of the Ma administration, 14 cross-Strait agreements, including the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), have been concluded, showing that under the principle of safeguarding national sovereignty and the people’s dignity, President Ma has the ability to maximize the functions of the “1992 Consensus.”

Quoting Mainland-based Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi’s remarks, some believe that the Mainland would still welcome DPP figures to visit the Mainland, despite the fact that the DPP refused to recognize the “1992 Consensus.” However, we believe that Yang Yi was only expressing the Mainland’s desire to have exchanges with DPP figures. The key point is “exchanges,” which is different from “negotiations.” We wonder whether the Mainland would be willing to engage in consultations with any of Taiwan’s political parties in the absence of the “1992 Consensus.”

Turnover of political parties is normal under a democratic system. We encourage opposition parties to respect the existing ROC Constitutional framework and return to the track of the “1992 Consensus.” We firmly believe that it is in the best interests of the people on Taiwan for the the ruling and opposition parties to reach a consensus on the “1992 Consensus.” In addition, if the two sides of the Strait could fully implement all cross-Strait agreements, we are confident and willing that, at the appropriate time, and under adequate preparations, we will be able to expand our mutual experiences in consultations to other fields, i.e., culture, politics, and even the military. This would be the beginning of fully normalizing cross-Strait relations. 

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