Tsai Ing-wen on 1992 Consensus: Signs of Slight Shifting of Positions

Tsai Ing-wen on 1992 Consensus: Signs of Slight Shifting of Positions

United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)

A Translation

December 29, 2015

Executive Summary:

Tsai Ing-wen need not quibble over "1992 consensus" vs. "1992 fact". That is merely the crust of the custard pie. That is mere self-deception. After all, does Tsai Ing-wen really want to trade "one China, different interpretations”, the filling inside the custard pie for the crust?

Full Text Below:

Following the Ma-Xi summit, Zhang Zhijun, Director of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, addressed the DPP. He said, "Recognizing the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus and agreeing with its core meaning (is sufficient) ." Tsai Ing-wen recently declared, "The DPP has not denied the historical facts of talks in 1992. The DPP also recognizes the process and fact of the consultation and communication between the two sides in seeking common ground and shelving differences that year."

Tsai Ing-wen has flip-flopped on the 1992 Consensus yet again. But her flip-flop is not complete. This time, as we can see, Tsai Ing-wen was yielding to Beijing, and not, as Tsai Ing-wen predicted, “as long as it wins the general election, Beijing would yield to the DPP."

Zhang Zhijun asked, and Tsai Ing-wen answered. Such terms as "historical facts" and "recognize" were all parts of Zhang Zhijun's vocabulary. Tsai Ing-wen only changed "1992 Consensus" to "1992 Cross-Strait Talks" and substituted “the process and fact of the consultation and communication between the two sides in seeking common ground and shelving differences that year” for “core meaning.”

Tsai Ing-wen has long refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Now, however, she finds herself painted into a corner. She is now splitting “1992” off from “Consensus.” She acknowledges that a meeting was held in 1992. She refers to the “consultation” as “a fact,” one that “sought common ground while shelving differences." Since she cannot refer to the result of the meeting as the 1992 Consensus, can she refer to it as “the fact of a 1992 Consultation"? But the two are one and the same. So why has she made such a fuss over the 1992 Consensus up until now?

Tsai Ing-wen's retreat can be viewed from two perspectives: Beijing's and Tsai Ing-wen's.

Consider Beijing's perspective. Tsai Ing-wen has revealed that she cannot but accept the historical facts. Beijing has been monitoring the shifting of her positions. But she refuses to stick to the script. She refuses to come right out and recognize the 1992 Consensus, thus being unable to resolve the unsettling cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen has substituted “1992 fact” for “1992 Consensus.” Has she reinforced the levee? Or is it an ominous sign of the levee’s collapse?

Consider Tsai Ing-wen's perspective. She has substituted the “1992 fact” for "1992 Consensus," very possibly prolonging the cross-Strait stalemate and increasing its cost. Chronic confrontations are not necessarily beneficial to the Big Picture. Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen should instead bite the bullet and recognize the 1992 Consensus outright before she makes the most of “seeking common ground while shelving differences.”

Tsai Ing-wen has acknowledged that the 1992 consensus sought common ground while shelving differences. But she has not explained just what the common ground and differences are. The very origin of seeking common ground and shelving differences in the 1992 Consensus is that, "Both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one China principle. But they differ on the meaning of one China.” Accordingly, "Both sides agree to express their own position verbally." Based on this premise, Beijing has emphasized "opposition to Taiwan independence,” and reiterated that “both sides are part of one China." The Ma government has emphasized "one China, different interpretations," and "no (immediate) reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force." This is the framework of the 1992 Consensus. This is what enables "seeking common ground while shelving differences." If Tsai Ing-wen recognizes "seeking common ground" in the 1992 Consensus, she must manifest herself whether she affirms that pursuant to the ROC Constitution, she recognizes the "one China principle" and defend "one China, different interpretations.”

The phrase "seeking common ground while shelving differences" necessarily implies "one China, different interpretations." However, it may not include "one state on either side" or the Taiwan independence party platform. In other words, "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is not empty rhetoric. One must specify “What common ground? What differences?”

Tsai Ing-wen says she wishes to "maintain the status quo." But she says her "status quo" is not Ma Ying-jeou's “status quo.” Tsai has held forth on “democracy vs. backroom operations,” on “shared vs. monopolized,” on “options vs. limitations.” But that was mere rhetoric, invoking technical details, rather than fundamental principles. Tsai Ing-wen has said that her Republic of China and Ma Ying-jeou's Republic of China are different. Her Republic of China includes only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. It includes only the Tamshui River and Tsoshui Creek, whereas Ma Ying-jeou's one China includes the Yangtze River and Heilongjiang. Tsai Ing-wen said that Ma Ying-jeou's one China is the same as Beijing's one China.

However, if we return to the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen can no longer use technical details to obfuscate principles. Her “status quo” is different. Her “ROC” is different. Her “China” is different. These are all matters of fundamental principle. The 1992 Consensus refers to “seeking common ground while shelving differences.” Does she really think the differences she refers to are the same as those referred to in the 1992 Consensus? Does she really think that her own “seeking common ground while shelving differences” will enable her to interact with Beijing?

Tsai Ing-wen has already yielded to Beijing on the 1992 consensus. This move is worth encouraging. It is also inevitable. Tsai must not say, "Ma Ying-jeou and I are not the same." If she is elected and assumes power, she will be the beneficiary of Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait legacy. That includes 23 cross-Strait agreements, Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, peaceful development, a diplomatic truce, one China, different interpretations, the legalized platform for cross-Strait consultation mechanism at three levels, and the Ma-Xi summit. She should be respectful and grateful, and she should cheish the legacy. She should ask herself how she can be more like Ma Ying-jeou. For Ma Ying-jeou blazed a trail for Tsai Ing-wen:  from the 1992 consensus, he got one China, different interpretations.

Tsai Ing-wen need not quibble over "1992 consensus" vs. "1992 fact". That is merely the crust of the custard pie. That is mere self-deception. After all, does Tsai Ing-wen really want to trade "one China, different interpretations”, the filling inside the custard pie for the crust?

Once again, we urge Tsai Ing-wen to bite the bullet. Tsai must ask herself how she can recognize and develop the 1992 consensus, within the framework of the ROC Constitution. 

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